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PRIVATE TRANSFERS, INFORMAL LOANS AND RIKS SHARING AMONG 
POOR URBAN HOUSEHOLDS 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The average household in the poor regions of the world is often faced with consumption 
risks that result from income and related shocks. In rural areas, such shocks include 
weather calamities that negatively affect crop production, adverse price shocks, loss of 
crops to pests, sickness or death of the household head or other working members, 
unexpected ceremonial expenses etc. In urban areas, income swings are often associated 
with the incidence and duration of unemployment, sickness of earning members and 
impending medical expenses, flailing business income for business operating households 
etc. Accordingly, while households in both rural and urban areas may be exposed to 
certain common types of shocks, some other risks can be peculiar to the social, livelihood 
and production structures prevailing in the specific community. Nevertheless, faced with 
various sources of income risk, it is reasonable that households strive to protect 
consumption through different means, formal or informal, and across time and space. 
 
The question of how well households cope with and share risk has been at the forefront of 
the risk-sharing literature, mostly in the context of rural areas of developing economies. 
But most of the empirical tests have been aggregate, consumption based (see for 
example, Townsend, 1994; Deaton, 1997; Jalan and Ravallion, 1999). The hypothesis in 
these tests is that if households efficiently share risk, controlling for aggregate 
community income, changes in individual income should not have a significant effect on 
consumption. The particular mechanism(s) (or instruments) that households adopt for 
risk-sharing purposes is not apparent from such an approach (see Alderman and Paxson, 
1994; Cox and Jimenez, 1998; Fafcahmps and Lund, 2003, for similar observations). 
 
Knowledge of the actual means of insurance used by households, which are likely to be 
informal in nature for most poor regions of the world, has policy relevance of multiple 
dimensions. For instance, if interhousehold transfers and informal loans are the primary 
means through which households cope with risk, and they are found to be reasonably 
efficient, it may be the case that public insurance programs simply substitute these 
mechanisms with little or no gain in net social welfare. In fact, given the informational 
advantages that such households have (in assessing the magnitude and source of risk) 
relative to an outside principal, public insurance may even be less efficient.  
 2 
On the other hand, if appropriate tests reveal that households self-insure through, say, 
accumulation of liquid and non-liquid assets, and that only relatively wealthy households 
are able to do so, targeted public insurance for the liquidity-constrained poor households 
may be efficiency-enhancing. 
 
This paper contributes to a growing literature that investigates the mechanisms of risk-
sharing among poor households. There are two aspects of the paper that are particularly 
relevant in the context of the literature. First, it focuses on poor urban areas. The 
disproportionate focus in the literature on rural households has meant that we know 
relatively little about the risk-sharing practices of poor urban households. Given that 
formal insurance is largely absent even in urban areas of most developing economies, it is 
apparent that these households may be no less vulnerable to income risk than their rural 
counterparts. Furthermore, because of lack of survey data, the little we know about risk 
sharing between poor urban households has come from small, targeted surveys. The use 
of a nationally representative urban survey data in this study is particularly appealing in 
this regard.
1
 Second, the study uses information on both private transfer and informal 
loan activities to assess whether each mechanism serves risk sharing purposes. The 
simultaneous treatment of both potential instruments sheds light on relative performance, 
and also highlights idiosyncrasies that affect household participation in either (or both) 
mechanisms. It has been argued in the literature that if households are motivated by 
altruism, private transfers in the form of pure gifts are the primary means through which 
risk-sharing occurs. However, if enforcement problems are pronounced, informal credit 
with contingent repayment may be used to realize self-enforcing risk-sharing contracts 
(Fafchamps, 1999). Fafchamps and Lund (2003) argue that such enforcement problems 
are the reason behind their finding that informal loans (quasi-credit), and not gifts and 
transfers, perform risk-sharing functions in rural Filipino networks.      
 
The literature has noted that, in the absence of formal insurance, poor households often 
devise various means of pooling risk. It has been documented that within and inter-
household transfers in the form of remittances and gifts are used for consumption 
smoothing purposes by rural households in Botswana and India (Lucas and Stark, 1985; 
Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Rosenzweig, 1988). Informal loans with zero or small 
interest, no collateral and contingent repayment serve insurance purposes in the face of 
                                                 
1
 Recent studies of East European economies have used survey data (see for instance, Skoufias, 2003 and 
Skoufias, 2004 for Russia and Bulgaria, respectively). 
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shocks and income variability (Udry, 1990, 1994; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). 
Households also accumulate savings and assets to run down in times of uncertainty and 
hardship (Paxson, 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). In other evidence, households 
engage in income smoothing activities prior to the occurrence of shocks. Examples of 
such measures include crop diversification and choice of low return-low risk varieties by 
farming households (Dercon, 1996) and involvement in off-farm activities (Kochar, 
1999; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). Labor and resource sharing is still another route 
households take to help each other in times of need (Platteau, 1997). 
 
The nuances of urban living imply that risk-sharing in poor urban areas can be a 
distinctly different exercise than that in rural areas. Cox and Jimenez (1998) argue that it 
is difficult to judge a priori whether poor urban settings suit risk-sharing practices better 
than rural ones. Proximity and relative occupational uniformity significantly mitigate 
information problems in rural areas and promote risk-sharing arrangements. However, 
these same characteristics imply that rural households are subject to the same aggregate 
risk, which renders risk-sharing ineffective, while urban households are not. Urban risk-
sharing, in contrast, is infected with significant moral hazard problems, even more so 
because of the relatively loose social structure that worsens information problems. Which 
way risk-sharing performance sways is therefore an empirical question.  
 
The data reveal that transfers and loans in urban Ethiopia are largely informal, often 
transacted between relatives and friends. They are also primarily used to augment 
nondurable (especially food) consumption, supporting the hypothesis that they may be 
among the main instruments of consumption smoothing. The regression results further 
show that private transfers in urban Ethiopia significantly respond to presumed proxies of 
income risk. Unemployment of the head, female headship and in some cases sickness 
increase the probability of net transfer receipts. In contrast, informal loans do not seem to 
respond to any of these shocks. This latter result may imply that such loans, though 
informal, have very much the characteristics of formal loans where repayment 
considerations factor in to determine flow patterns; hence nullifying their potential use as 
instruments of insurance. The results suggest that altruistically motivated transfers, 
compared to informal loans, better serve risk-sharing purposes in urban Ethiopia. 
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II. Data 
 
2.1. Source 
 
The data for the analyses in this paper come from the Ethiopian Urban Socio-Economic 
Surveys (EUSES) conducted by the Department of Economics, Addis Ababa University, 
Ethiopia in collaboration with various national and international institutions.
2
The 
nationally representative surveys collect extensive information on household 
demographics, employment and income, consumption, migration, transfer and credit 
activity, health and welfare from households residing in seven major urban centers in the 
country. Each urban center is allocated a share of participant households in the survey 
according to its contribution to the total population. Accordingly, while Addis Ababa (the 
capital city), Dire-Dawa and Awassa were allocated 900, 125 and 75 households, 
respectively, the other four cities (Bahir-Dar, Dessie, Jimma and Mekele) each 
contributed 100 households. Four rounds of the survey conducted between 1994 and 
2000 are available to date.  
 
For the current study, we use data from the first three rounds of the survey, collected in 
September 1994, November 1995 and January 1997. These rounds have a strong panel 
structure, tracking the same households whenever possible. In constructing our sample, 
we dropped households that reported operating formal businesses. We believe that such 
households have a structurally different income source composition and attitude towards 
risk from the average household.
3
 Regardless, the random sampling ensures that all 
income groups are represented in our sample. After data cleaning and dropping 
households with missing values for important variables, the final sample for this study 
consists of 2504 observations. This final sample derives information from 1202 
households, each household contributing at most 3 observations, whenever available. 
 
The unit of analysis for the current study is the household. However, the design of the 
surveys is such that most of the relevant questions were asked at the member level. As a 
result, enormous aggregations were required to arrive at household level values for 
important variables like income, private transfers and informal loans. 
 
                                                 
2
 The Collaborating institutions are Institute of Development Research, Ethiopia (1994 round); the then 
Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation, Ethiopia and Michigan State University (1995 
round); University of Goteborg, Sweden (1994, 1997 and 2000 rounds). 
3
 Since pre-transfer income and activity choice are considered exogenous for our analysis, this will not 
cause a sample selection problem. 
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2.2. Private Transfers and Informal Loans 
 
As noted above, the primary objective of this paper is to investigate whether private 
transfers and informal loans serve as instruments of risk-sharing among poor urban 
households. We focus on these mechanisms for two reasons. First, public insurance and 
formal credit services (especially for consumption related purposes) are barely available 
in poor urban economies. Second, since revealing (and verifying) vulnerability to 
consumption risk is generally difficult, closely-knit relationships that can resolve the 
associated moral hazard and adverse selection problems provide potentially thriving 
means of insurance.  
 
We define private transfers and informal loans primarily based the source of receipts. 
Transactions that take place with resident and non-resident household members, friends, 
relatives, neighbors etc. are considered private (informal) and are included for analysis. 
Local administrations, the government and non-governmental organizations (for 
transfers), and banks and credit associations (for loans) constitute formal sources and the 
associated transactions are excluded for the purposes of this paper. The amounts analyzed 
include both cash and value of in-kind transfers and loans.  
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on participation in private transfer and informal loan 
activities by urban households in Ethiopia. Statistics on amounts of transfers and loans 
conditional on participation are also presented. The transfer and loan summaries are 
based on activities in the 12 months prior to the survey month. The income statistics refer 
to monthly amounts. The figures in the table show that about 31% of households in the 
sample reported involvement in some type of transfer activity; a third of the sample 
reported participation in similar loan exchange (as recipients, givers or both; figures refer 
to the pooled sample). The participation statistics reveal that households are much more 
likely to receive than give transfers. This is even more so the case for loans. Average 
annual net transfer receipts (defined as transfers received minus transfers given) amount 
to 3.5 times mean monthly income. The comparable figures for loans are much less, 
however, whereby the mean annual net loan receipt (defined as loans received-loans 
repaid-loans given+ repayments received) is about half of average monthly household 
income.
4
 While most of the participation figures are comparable across years, the average 
                                                 
4
 If we assume net receipts are evenly distributed across months, average monthly transfer and loan receipts 
represent 30% and 5% of average monthly income, respectively.   
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transfer and loan magnitudes for 1995 are remarkably smaller than those for 1994 and 
1997. The relatively large standard deviations accompanying the means also show that 
there is a large degree of variation in income, transfer and loan flows between 
households.
5
 
 
Sources of private transfers and informal loans are summarized in Table 2. As the 
responses to the transfer and loan questions were recorded at the member level, the 
statistics are based on receipts by individuals residing in the final sample of households. 
It is shown that an overwhelming majority of transfers involve inter-household 
transactions among relatives and friends. ‘Other’ (consisting of dowry, inheritances and 
unspecified) sources contribute less than 1% of total transfer receipts.
6
 The same is true 
for loan receipts; 80% of loan exchange takes place between friends, relatives or 
neighbors. Informal networks—referred to as equb and iddir/mahber, rotating savings 
and credit and insurance associations, respectively—are sources to less than 3% of total 
loan receipts.
7
 
 
A summary of the reasons for transfer and loan receipts is presented in Table 3. Again 
these statistics are based on available responses by residents in the final sample of 
households. More than 2/3 of private transfer receipts by urban households in Ethiopia 
are intended for food consumption. Similarly, based on counts, about 47% of informal 
loans are used to augment food consumption. In case of loan receipts, however, the 
weighted statistics show that loans taken for nonfood-nondurable consumption (like 
educational, health, travel and rental expenses, etc.) are much larger in magnitude than 
those intended for food consumption.  
 
Overall, Tables 2 and 3 reveal that private transfers and informal loans indeed serve 
consumption smoothing purposes. Our a priori that the scarcity of formal sources of 
insurance and credit, and the informational advantages that are present in closely-knit 
                                                 
5
 The median income is 189.82 Birr. The median net transfer and loan amount is 400 and 0 Birr, 
respectively. The reason behind the 0 median value for net credit receipts is that an interestingly large 
(16%) of households reported fully repaying loans taken (or getting full repayments for loans extended) 
during the year.  
6
 Given that the focus is on private transfers, those from governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, which often take the form of food aid, are excluded from the analysis. In the original sample, 
such transfers amounted to about 13% of total transfer receipts.  
7
 In a similar manner, since the focus here is on informal loans, formal loan receipts are excluded from the 
analysis. However, a look at the original sample shows that loans from formal sources like banks and credit 
associations contribute to a very small proportion (about 8%) of total loans receipts.   
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relationships, may compel households to resort to reliance on private transfers and 
informal loans as instruments of insurance seems to be borne out. In the next section, we 
further examine the issue based on regression analysis. 
 
III. Specification 
 
This section investigates, using econometric evidence, whether households in poor urban 
areas share risk through the use of private transfers and informal loans. The hypothesis is 
that if households use either or both potential channels of informal insurance, net positive 
flows should occur to households experiencing negative income shocks. In this regard, 
one would ideally like to obtain a measure of (unexpected, transitory) income variability 
and examine its correlation with the direction of net transfer and loan flows. Given the 
available information in the EUSES and that we only have at most three data points per 
household, we are not able to generate an exogenous measure of income risk to include as 
an explanatory variable.
8
  
 
Lack of a direct measure of income variability may be a caveat of the study. However, we 
argue that it is also very difficult for partnering households to reveal (and verify) the 
nature of idiosyncratic income variations. That is, income changes per se may be poor 
signals for risk-sharing purposes anyway, and are unlikely to determine transfer and loan 
flows, if indeed the latter serve risk-sharing practices. This is especially true for urban 
areas. While households in rural areas can fairly objectively assess the seasonal harvests 
of a neighboring farming household, the varied occupational undertakings by urban 
households imply a similar exercise is likely to be difficult.
9
 
 
                                                 
8
 In the welfare section of the surveys, households were asked to give the nature/direction of income change 
that they have experienced (within the past three years for the 1994 round, and since the previous survey 
for the 1995 and 1997 rounds). Unfortunately, the definition of ‘income’ in the respective question is not 
clear, and it is worrisome that households could impute net transfer, loan and other unearned income in 
their subjective calculation of income change. We experimented with the use of the variable as a proxy for 
income shocks, but our worry seems to have been proven in that the estimated coefficient had the ‘wrong 
sign’ (i.e. positive income changes were positively correlated with net transfer receipts) and was not 
statistically significant in almost all specifications.  
9
 A similar comparison between urban and rural households can be made when it comes to the difficulty 
involving revelation and verification of effort in production. This problem is potentially much more severe 
in urban areas because of the large variations in employment types and human capital. A similar point was 
made by Cox and Jimenez (1998). The relatively loose societal structure in urban compared to rural areas is 
another reason for a more significant moral hazard problem.   
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Consequently, we argue that, empirically, transfer and loan flows may be dictated more 
by readily observable signals of vulnerability to consumption risk than idiosyncratic 
income changes.
10
 Such signals constitute age composition of a household, female 
headship, employment status, number of working members, health status etc. The 
hypothesis is that if private transfers and loans fulfill risk-sharing purposes between 
urban households, those households exhibiting characteristics that are often positively 
correlated with vulnerability to consumption risk are more likely to be net recipients, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
To test this hypothesis, we estimate separate incidence equations for transfer and loan 
receipts.
11
 The explanatory variables that are used in the estimations are summarized in 
Table 4. The statistics reveal that the average household in the sample consists of 5.7 
members. A somewhat surprisingly large proportion (42%) of households were female 
headed, while the mean age of heads was about 49 years
12
. Heads have 5 years of 
schooling on average, while the mean years of schooling of all members above 15 years 
of age is 6.7 years. A fifth of heads were unemployed. A similar proportion reported 
having disabilities half of which are chronic. About 15% of heads reported experiencing 
sickness in the four weeks prior to survey date (see Appendix for definition and 
construction of variables). 
 
We argue that female headship, head’s unemployment, head’s disability, number of 
workers and, to some extent, head’s sickness are relatively conspicuous signals of 
vulnerability to income shocks. Number of workers potentially shows income source 
diversification and increased ability to self-insure. Female headship and head’s disability 
signal the opposite. Unemployment and sickness of the head reveal negative income 
shocks. Controlling for number of workers, household size shows increased consumption 
needs. We control for age and human capital composition of the household to capture for 
liquidity constraint and life-cycle effects (see Cox et al, 1998, 2004, among others). Pre-
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 This is more true for transfers. If informal loans are pure credit, repayment considerations factor in to 
determine flow patterns. 
11
 OLS estimation using the amount of transfers and loans resulted in statistically insignificant coefficients 
in most cases. In comparison, as is often the case in the literature, the coefficients in incidence equations 
are much better determined (see for example, Cox and Jimenez, 1998, and Kuhn and Stillman, 2004). 
12
 A potential explanation for the large proportion of female headed households is that many women may 
have experienced separations from or death of husbands in the prolonged civil war that ended in 1991. It 
has also been noted that reintegration of ex-soldiers has been difficult in urban compared to rural areas 
(Dercon and Ayalew, 1998). 
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transfer income is the main variable scrutinized in the motives for transfer—altruism 
versus exchange—debate in the literature (Cox, 1987; Altonji et al., 1997).  
 
Based on the categorization of households into three groups—as net givers, neither net 
givers nor net recipients, and net recipients—we estimate an ordered probit model for 
transfers and loans separately. Assume that 

hz  represents the latent variable that 
determines the transfer (loan) net receipt status of household h . The latent variable  hz  is 
given by a linear function:  
 
hhh Xz  
 ,  
 
where hX  denotes a vector of  household characteristics and shock proxies,  represents 
a vector of regression coefficients, and h  denotes an error term which is assumed to be 
distributed standard normal. 
 
Assume  hZ represents the observed categorical variable for transfer (loan) net receipt 
status.  hZ is then related to the latent variable  

hz  according to the following: 
 
1hZ  if 1

hz , 
0hZ  if 21  

hz , and  
1hZ  if 2

hz . 
 
1hZ , 0hZ  and 1hZ  represent net giver, neither net recipient nor net giver, and 
net recipient status, respectively. The cut-off points ( ’s) are estimated along with the 
regression parameters (Maddala, 1983; Long, 1997).   
 
Distribution of the pooled estimation sample based on net transfer (loan) receipt status is 
presented in Table 5.
13
It is shown that the proportion of net recipients is significantly 
larger than that of net givers. This may show that a few, relatively better-off households 
carry a significant burden of responsibility for the provision of transfers and loans. In the 
case of transfers, it may also highlight the role played by remittances received from non-
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 For both transfers and loans, the pooled sample reflects a very similar distribution to the ones obtained 
for the cross-section of households (i.e. by year). The proportion of net recipients of transfers is comparable 
to what other studies that rely on national survey have reported (see for example, Cox et al, 1998, for urban 
Peru, and Kuhn and Stillman, 2004 for urban Russia). Using Philippines data for private transfers, Cox et al 
(2004) present a much larger proportion of households that are net recipients (about 80%), but net givers 
accounted for about 10% of the sample. 
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domestic sources. For the third category of households that are neither net givers nor net 
recipients, we do not distinguish between households that were not involved in receiving 
and/or giving at all and those that have net zero values because of canceling out. This is 
especially noteworthy in case of loans because, as noted earlier, 16% of observations that 
belong to this category were involved in loan activities but have fully paid loans taken (or 
received full payments for loans given). This provides further evidence that households 
may indeed use informal loans to relieve transitory negative pressures on income and 
consumption.  
 
IV. Results 
 
The ordered probit estimates are presented in Table 6a. We first discuss the results for the 
estimations done on the pooled sample. The estimates for the transfer equation show that 
female headship and head’s unemployment increase the likelihood of being a net transfer 
recipient while number of workers/earners in the household decreases it. Increase in 
income also makes households less likely to be net recipients. Household size, head’s age 
and human capital composition have no effect on the probability of net receipts. 
Similarly, temporal sickness and permanent disability, even chronic, seem to have no 
effect.
14
 In general, the estimates seem to conform to the risk-sharing hypothesis. If 
increases in income and number of earners in the family are positively correlated with 
household’s ability to self-ensure (and, generally, a more stable income stream), they lead 
to a reduced dependence on or need for transfer receipts. Head’s unemployment, which is 
a more visible signal for negative pressures on income and consumption, is found to be 
positively associated with transfer receipts. The same effect is seen for female headship, 
which we argue is a perceived indicator of increased vulnerability to income variability.
15
 
 
The estimates for the loan equation show two significant differences to those of the 
transfer equation: female headship and head’s unemployment do not affect loan receipts. 
Presumably, repayment capacity of potential recipients may be an important determinant 
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 Estimations that included regional dummies resulted in almost identical results. Furthermore, as a group, 
the regional dummies were never significant.  
15
 Some studies argue that female headship, by construct, should be highly correlated with transfer receipts 
because it shows husbands that have migrated in search of work and remit cash regularly (Cox et al, 2004; 
Cox and Jimenez, 1998). This is especially true when considering rural households and countries with 
significant international migration (e.g. the Philippines in case of Cox et al, 2004). None of these two is the 
case in this study. One may argue that there can be significant migration to the capital city, Addis Ababa, 
from the other urban centers. This is not the case either, as the 41% proportion of female headed 
households in the capital shows the survey average female headship ratio is typical of all regions.  
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of the decision to give (and maybe even to request) loans. Furthermore, household size 
has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of loan receipts. Considering that 
we are controlling for household income and number of workers, this indicates that 
household size may show increased consumption needs and/or additional worth as visible 
collateral.  Head’s schooling seems to decrease the likelihood of loan receipts, holding 
everything else constant. The lack of significant effect of outward income risk proxies 
like head’s unemployment and female headship implies that informal loans may not serve 
risk-sharing purposes in these areas. 
 
Table 6a also presents results using a random effects ordered probit estimator. This is 
performed to check whether the results discussed above are robust to controls for 
household heterogeneities. It can be seen that, for both the transfer and loan equations, 
the random effects estimates largely follow the trend set by the pooled estimates. The 
notable changes when we control for household effects are that household income is no 
more statistically significant in the transfer equation and is significant at only 10% level 
in the loan equation; and that female headship and unemployment in the transfer equation 
have larger effects compared to the pooled estimates. The difference in results is 
intuitive. In the risk sharing equation, income should not matter when there are 
observable shock variables, and looses its significance as a proxy for other household-
specific effects in the presence of controls for the latter. For loans, however, income 
remains relevant (though at the 10% level) because it represents household resources, 
which in turn determine the demand for loans for consumption smoothing purposes.  
 
Table 6b presents the marginal effects of the estimates in Table 6a for the select variables 
that can be deemed potential outward indicators of household risk and vulnerability in a 
poor urban setting. Marginal effects in case of ordered probit estimation are typically 
computed as the implied change in probability within each category of status. 
Accordingly, Table 6b shows marginal effects for the three respective categories of net 
giver ( 1hZ ), neither net recipient nor net giver ( 0hZ ) and net recipient ( 1hZ ). 
Because the pooled estimates in Table 6a are typically lower than the random effects 
estimates, and also because their marginal effects are computationally easier to calculate, 
the reported marginal effects in Table 6b are based on the pooled results. As can be seen 
from the marginal effects, female headship and head’s unemployment have economically 
significant effects on net transfer receipt status. Female headship increases the likelihood 
 12 
of net transfer recipient status by 10 percentage points, decreases a neutral (neither giver 
nor recipient) status by 6.1 percentage points and decreases net giver status by 3.8 
percentage points. Similarly, head’s unemployment increases the probability of net 
receipts by 10.7 percentage points while decreasing the likelihood of the zero and net 
giver categories by 7.1 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively. Looking at the variables 
with a statistically significant effect in the loan equation, head’s chronic disability 
increases the likelihood that a household will be a net recipient of loans by 5.1 percentage 
points, while a unit increase in household size raises the probability by 0.8 percentage 
points. Number of workers has the opposite effect, decreasing the likelihood by 2.3 
percentage points. 
 
To further analyze the determinants of receiving and giving, and examine the presumed 
symmetry that should exist, we also estimate separate probit equations for transfer (loan) 
receipts and giving. The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Again we report pooled 
as well as random effects estimates. The results in Table 7 show that female headship, 
unemployment and sickness (in the random effects specification) are associated with 
larger probability of receiving transfers. Female headship and head’s unemployment raise 
the probability of net receipts by 14.5 and 13.8 percentage points, respectively. 
Household size causes the probability to decline. Notably, increased head’s schooling 
improves the likelihood of transfer receipts. The loan receipt probit results are also shown 
in Table 7. As was the case in the ordered probit specification, the income risk proxies 
like unemployment, sickness and female head have no effect on the likelihood of loan 
receipts. This further confirms that informal loans may not be an effective means of 
consumption smoothing for the poor in urban Ethiopia. 
 
The probit estimates for transfer (loan) giving are shown in Table 8. Comparing the 
results in Tables 7 and 8, one can observe remarkable symmetry between the net transfer 
recipient and net giver equations. The variables with significant coefficients in the net 
transfer giver equation—income (in the pooled estimates), female headship, head’s 
schooling, number of workers and head’s unemployment—all but head’s schooling have 
reversed signs compared to the corresponding coefficients for net receipts. The major 
exception is head’s schooling. In general, better head schooling seems to increase 
participation in transfer activity—that is, it is associated with higher probability of giving 
as well as receiving. This may be indicative of better networking opportunities for 
educated heads. As can be seen in Table 8, we fail to find significance in the loan giving 
pooled or random effects probit estimates.  
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Overall, based on the regression results, one can conclude that private transfers serve 
risk-sharing purposes in urban Ethiopia while informal transfers do not. Interestingly, the 
contrasting results for the two potential mechanisms of insurance could highlight a more 
subtle but important distinction between ‘risk sharing’ and ‘consumption smoothing’. 
Private transfers respond to income risk proxies and enable risk sharing, thereby 
smoothing the consumption of unfortunate households (at least partially). But 
consumption smoothing can operate without risk sharing. Informal loans do not respond 
to income risk proxies, which rules out their relevance for risk sharing, but they do 
respond to indicators of household resources like income and number of workers, and 
resource needs like household size. Therefore, households that need to augment current 
consumption due to a variety of reasons (e.g. holiday celebrations, purchase of durable 
goods, impending ceremonies like weddings, child birth, educational and travel expenses 
etc.) and lack the resources to do so could seek loans to fulfill their needs. This is 
precisely what is borne out in the descriptive statistics. In Table 2, it is shown that what 
can be largely categorized as ‘non-insurance’ items (e.g. nonfood-nondurable 
consumption, durable consumption, business expenditure, ceremonial expenses etc.) 
constitute about 25% of the reasons for transfer receipts and 50 to 75 percent (unweighted 
and weighted statistics) of the reasons for loan receipts. As such, fixed, short term 
informal loans smooth consumption without necessarily serving risk-sharing practices. 
 
Excluding Remittances 
 
As shown in Table 2, transfers by nonresident household members mostly in the form of 
remittances constitute about 25.8% of all transfers. While this proportion is not that high 
per se, a valid argument can be made that the underlying mechanisms driving remittance 
receipts are very different from typical inter-household transfers. For once, it can be 
argued that most remitters may have informational advantages on the income or other 
status of a household relative to neighbors or friends with no kinship to the household. 
Therefore, remittances may have a more magnified role in risk-sharing if they are not 
hampered by associated information problems of income revelation and verification. In 
contrast, if remittances are recurrent (e.g. regularly sent by a migrating spouse or 
member) irrespective of the status of a household or sent for specific purposes (e.g. to aid 
 14 
educational expenditures on children), they may have very little relevance for risk-
sharing. Since the evidence above suggests that transfers (and not informal loans) seem to 
be responsive to outward indicators of household risk and vulnerability, it is useful to 
find out how this evidence is affected by the inclusion of remittances as part of total 
transfers. 
 
For this, we subtracted the value of any transfers labeled as ‘remittances’ from total 
household transfers received or given out. We then rerun the ordered probit and probit 
estimates using the leftover amount, which largely comprises only inter-household 
transfers. The results are presented in Table 9. 
 
According to the ordered probit estimates in Table 9, the likelihood of net transfer 
receipts excluding remittances still rises with female headship and falls with number of 
workers and income. The difference with corresponding results in Table 6a is that now 
head’s unemployment does not have a statistically significant impact while head’s 
schooling lowers the probability of net recipient status. When looking at the probit 
estimates in Table 9 though, head’s unemployment still raises the likelihood of transfer 
receipts. In comparison, household size does not seem to have any effect in the probit 
estimates in Table 9 though it reduced the likelihood of transfer receipts when including 
remittances (shown in Table 7). For the net giver probit estimates in Table 9, both female 
headship and head’s unemployment lack statistical significance while most other 
variables preserve their signs and significance. In general, it can be inferred that the 
exclusion of remittances from transfers does not qualitatively change the results of and 
conclusions derived from the analysis of total transfers including remittances. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Based on nationally representative survey data from poor urban areas, we investigate 
whether households use private transfers and informal loans for risk-sharing purposes. A 
break-down of reported uses of transfer receipts shows that they are primarily intended 
for augmenting food consumption; loan receipts are mostly used for nondurable 
consumption, food plus nonfood. However, results from pooled and ordered probit 
estimates indicate that transfer receipts, not loans, respond to the presumed income risk 
 15 
proxies. We explain loan flows as serving desired consumption goals that are mostly 
unrelated to insurance. 
 
As transfers seem to serve risk-sharing purposes, there is a possibility that the provision 
of public insurance potentially changes private incentives and simply substitutes private 
insurance. In situations of aggregate risk, however, private transfers are not effective and 
well-timed public insurance programs would be much warranted. The development of 
insurance and financial markets in such economies also provides households, at least 
those that may not engage in transfer arrangements for a variety of reasons, alternative 
ways to protect consumption during adverse idiosyncratic income shocks. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Income, Transfers and Loans (Proportions, Means 
and Standard Deviations) 
 
Variable Pooled 1994 1995 1997 
Income 416.12 
(1441.42) 
387.26 
(1146.06) 
394.10 
(1348.20 
486.98 
(1890.93) 
Transfers     
Transfer status     
Any transfer activity 30.51 29.01 30.19 33.23 
Received transfers 23.88 22.14 23.95 26.53 
Gave transfers 9.90 9.64 9.55 10.73 
Transfers amount     
Transfers received 2073.74 
(5496.84) 
2424.93 
(6933.05) 
1245.76 
(2019.34) 
2490.50 
(5814.46) 
Transfers given 494.26 
(759.39) 
422.81 
(555.74) 
532.31 
(750.78) 
554.84 
(985.49) 
Net transfers received 1462.73 
(4975.02) 
1710.14 
(6150.62) 
819.75 
(1977.17) 
1808.79 
(5350.95) 
Loans     
Loan status     
Any loan activity 33.15 32.44 37.45 29.21 
Received loans 30.19 29.10 34.52 26.83 
Gave loans 5.67 6.68 4.97 4.92 
Loans amount     
Loans received 272.67 
(1901.72) 
392.49 
(2925.97) 
178.24 
(527.29) 
211.82 
(503.21) 
Loans given 166.08 
(545.54) 
149.49 
(613.47) 
224.23 
(564.74) 
132.58 
(339.52) 
Net loans received 219.95 
(1668.53) 
321.31 
(2525.23) 
134.56 
(558.26) 
172.21 
(500.25) 
N     2054     1048      785      671 
Note: Proportions are given in percentages. Amount statistics are conditional on involvement in transfer or 
loan activity. Transfers and loans are given in real 1994 Ethiopian birr. N corresponds to total size of the 
pooled or yearly samples. 
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Table 2: Transfer and Loan Sources  
 Unweighted Weighted 
Transfers   
Nonresident household member 25.76 32.26 
Relative or friend 73.90 67.55 
Other 0.34 0.19 
N    885    885 
Loans   
Money lender 4.26 5.52 
Friend, relative or neighbor 80.72 79.90 
Informal network 1.60 2.89 
Other 13.42 11.68 
N    939    939 
Note: Statistics are based on household member-level transfer and loan transactions. The weights are 
transfer or loan amounts given in real 1994 Ethiopian birr. 
 
Table 3: Transfer and Loan Reason 
 Transfers Loans 
Use Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Food consumption 68.68 69.28 47.26 22.36 
Nonfood-nondurable consumption 15.01 8.01 22.28 25.84 
Durable consumption 5.79 4.24 12.59 16.57 
Business expenditure 1.18 6.48 11.30 31.32 
Saving related 2.36 6.79   
Ceremonial expenses   4.09 2.83 
Other 6.97 5.20 2.48 1.08 
N    846    846    929    929 
Note: Statistics are based on available household member-level transfer and loan transactions. The weights 
are transfer or loan amounts given in real 1994 Ethiopian birr. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics on Explanatory Variables (Means and Standard 
Deviations) 
Explanatory Variable Pooled 1994 1995 1997 
Household size 5.70 
(2.67) 
5.86 
(2.73) 
5.67 
(2.68) 
5.48 
(2.58) 
Female headed 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.44 
Head’s age 49.21 
(13.68) 
48.00 
(13.28) 
49.00 
(13.95) 
51.33 
(13.73) 
Head’s schooling 5.42 
(5.36) 
5.53 
(5.40) 
5.36 
(5.31) 
5.33 
(5.34) 
Average schooling 6.66 
(3.47) 
6.77 
(3.58) 
5.36 
(5.31) 
5.33 
(5.34) 
Number of workers 1.52 
(1.05) 
1.54 
(1.06) 
1.50 
(1.01) 
1.51 
(1.06) 
Head unemployed 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.24 
Head disabled 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.19 
Head chronically disabled 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.08 
Head sick 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.13 
N   2504   1048   785    671 
 
 
Table 5: Distribution of Estimation Sample based on Transfer and Credit Receipt 
Status 
 Transfers Credit 
Status Count Frequency Count Frequency 
Net givers 180 7.19 101 4.03 
Neither net-givers nor net-recipients 1741 69.53 1995 79.67 
Net recipients 583 23.28 408 16.29 
N 2054 100.00 2054 100.00 
Note: Distribution corresponds to the pooled sample. 
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Table 6a: Ordered probit estimates of net transfer and net loan receipts 
 
 Net transfer receipts Net loan receipts 
Variable Pooled Random effects Pooled Random effects 
Income -0.263×10-4*** 
(2.51) 
-0.190×10-4 
(0.90) 
-0.358×10-4*** 
(3.22) 
-0.373×10-4* 
(1.78) 
Household size -0.172×10-1 
(1.56) 
-0.208×10-1 
(1.38) 
0.345×10-1*** 
(2.87) 
0.364×10-1*** 
(2.64) 
Female headed 0.328*** 
(5.31) 
0.412*** 
(4.70) 
0.573×10-1 
(0.88) 
0.571×10-1 
(0.73) 
Head’s age -0.110×10-1 
(0.96) 
-0.118×10-1 
(0.75) 
-0.133×10-2 
(0.11) 
0.194×10-3 
(0.01) 
Head’s age squared 0.183×10-3* 
(1.70) 
0.209×10-3 
(1.42) 
-0.311×10-4 
(0.29) 
-0.485×10-4 
(0.36) 
Head’s schooling -0.518×10-2 
(0.61) 
-0.854×10-2 
(0.77) 
-0.160×10-1* 
(1.80) 
-0.169×10-1* 
(1.67) 
Average schooling 0.465×10-2 
(0.44) 
0.650×10-2 
(0.46) 
-0.145×10-1 
(1.31) 
-0.165×10-1 
(1.26) 
Number of workers -0.766×10-1*** 
(2.66) 
-0.835×10-1** 
(2.28) 
-0.933×10-1*** 
(3.17) 
-0.986×10-1*** 
(2.89) 
Head unemployed 0.337*** 
(5.19) 
0.435*** 
(4.79) 
-0.754×10-1 
(1.07) 
-0.838×10-1 
(1.03) 
Head sick 0.448×10-1 
(0.60) 
0.771×10-1 
(0.88) 
-0.206×10-2 
(0.03) 
-0.177×10-1 
(0.21) 
Head chronically 
disabled 
-0.907×10-1 
(1.11) 
-0.105 
(1.00) 
0.195** 
(2.21) 
0.213** 
(2.09) 
1  -1.626 
(5.40) 
-1.932 
(4.61) 
-2.044 
(6.31) 
-2.205 
(5.80) 
2  0.693 
(2.31) 
0.920 
(2.20) 
0.736 
(2.31) 
0.847 
(2.25) 
Log-likelihood -1855.83 -1806.39 -1491.76 -1482.06 
Wald-
2 (11) 181.26 155.28 58.88 44.27 
Notes: N=2054. Asymptotic |t| statistics are shown in parentheses. ***-shows significance at 1% level; **-
shows significance at 5%; *-shows significance at 10%.  
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Table 6b: Marginal effects of ordered probit estimates for potential household risk 
indicator variables 
 
 Net transfer receipts Net loan receipts 
 1hZ  0hZ  1hZ  1hZ  0hZ  1hZ  
Household size 0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 0.008 
Female headed -0.038 -0.061 0.099 -0.005 -0.009 0.014 
Head’s schooling 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.004 
Number of workers 0.009 0.013 -0.023 0.008 0.015 -0.023 
Head unemployed -0.035 -0.071 0.107 0.006 0.011 -0.018 
Head chronically  
disabled 
0.012 0.015 -0.026 -0.014 -0.037 0.051 
Note: 1hZ  denotes net giver status; 0hZ denotes neither net recipient nor net giver status; 
1hZ denotes net recipient status. Marginal effects are based on pooled estimates since they are relatively 
more amenable for computation.  
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Table 7: Probit estimates of net transfer and net loan receipts 
 
 Net transfer recipient Net loan recipient 
Variable Pooled Random effects Marginal effects Pooled Random effects Marginal effects 
Income -0.341×10-4 
(1.37) 
-0.266×10-4 
(0.62) 
-0.612×10-5 -0.192×10-3*** 
(2.74) 
-0.212×10-3*** 
(2.85) 
-0.418×10-4 
Household size -0.411×10-1*** 
(3.08) 
-0.467×10-1** 
(2.31) 
-0.107×10-1 0.408×10-1*** 
(2.98) 
0.453×10-1*** 
(2.67) 
0.894×10-2 
Female headed 0.408*** 
(5.64) 
0.598*** 
(5.11) 
0.145 0.308×10-1 
(0.40) 
0.274×10-1 
(0.28) 
0.541×10-2 
Head’s age -0.644×10-2 
(0.51) 
-0.616×10-2 
(0.31) 
-0.142×10-2 -0.787×10-2 
(0.58) 
-0.691×10-2 
(0.38) 
-0.136×10-2 
Head’s age squared 0.174×10-3 
(1.49) 
0.218×10-3 
(1.17) 
0.502×10-4 -0.649×10-6 
(0.01) 
-0.263×10-4 
(0.15) 
-0.519×10-5 
Head’s schooling 0.198×10-1** 
(2.04) 
0.255×10-1* 
(1.72) 
0.587×10-2 -0.113×10-1 
(1.09) 
-0.138×10-1 
(1.07) 
-0.273×10-2 
Average schooling 0.173×10-1 
(1.40) 
0.234×10-1 
(1.27) 
0.539×10-2 -0.831×10-2 
(0.63) 
-0.103×10-1 
(0.63) 
-0.203×10-2 
Number of workers -0.158×10-1 
(0.46) 
-0.240×10-1 
(0.49) 
-0.551×10-2 -0.793×10-1** 
(2.08) 
-0.839×10-1* 
(1.85) 
-0.165×10-1 
Head unemployed 0.381*** 
(5.29) 
0.522*** 
(4.60) 
0.138 -0.849×10-1 
(1.02) 
-0.987×10-1 
(0.97) 
-0.188×10-1 
Head sick 0.110 
(1.35) 
0.179* 
(1.65) 
0.439×10-1 0.228×10-1 
(0.26) 
0.846×10-2 
(0.08) 
0.167×10-2 
Head chronically disabled -0.133 
(1.35) 
-0.159 
(1.20) 
-0.342×10-1 0.193* 
(1.89) 
0.205* 
(1.71) 
0.444×10-1 
Constant -1.120*** 
(3.31) 
-1.671*** 
(3.03) 
 -0.557 
(1.53) 
-0.688 
(1.44) 
 
Log-likelihood -1274.14 -1220.77  -1088.25 -1074.59  
Wald-
2 (11) 163.37 107.37  41.85 37.47  
Notes: N=2054. Dependent variable is (a) for transfers: net transfer receipt=1 if net transfers received >0, zero otherwise; (b) for loans: net loan receipt=1 if net 
loans received >0, zero otherwise. Asymptotic |t| statistics are shown in parentheses. ***-shows significance at 1% level; **-shows significance at 5%; *-shows 
significance at 10%. Marginal effects are based on random effects estimates. 
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Table 8: Probit Estimates of net transfer and net loan giving 
 
 Net transfer giver Net loan giver 
Variable Pooled Random effects Marginal effects Pooled Random effects Marginal effects 
Income 0.290×10-4* 
(1.92) 
0.288×10-4 
(1.15) 
0.235×10-5 
 
-0.691×10-5 
(0.38) 
-0.936×10-5 
(0.19) 
-0.500×10-6 
 
Household size -0.183×10-1 
(0.95) 
-0.167×10-1 
(0.81) 
-0.136×10-2 -0.116×10-1 
(0.56) 
-0.117×10-1 
(0.48) 
-0.625×10-3 
Female headed -0.228** 
(2.08) 
-0.245** 
(1.98) 
-0.194×10-1 -0.114 
(1.00) 
-0.123 
(0.88) 
-0.648×10-2 
Head’s age 0.274×10-2 
(0.13) 
0.166×10-2 
(0.07) 
0.136×10-3 -0.167×10-1 
(0.77) 
-0.021
 
(0.83) 
-0.111×10-2 
Head’s age squared -0.596×10-4 
(0.28) 
-0.503×10-4 
(0.22) 
-0.411×10-5 
 
0.113×10-3 
(0.54) 
0.141×10-3 
(0.58) 
0.750×10-5 
 
Head’s schooling 0.416×10-1*** 
(3.08) 
0.463×10-1*** 
(3.09) 
0.378×10-2 0.163×10-1 
(1.02) 
0.161×10-1 
(0.94) 
0.860×10-3 
Average schooling 0.250×10-1 
(1.32) 
0.257×10-1 
(1.24) 
0.210×10-2 0.284×10-1 
(1.42) 
0.322×10-1 
(1.34) 
0.172×10-2 
Number of workers 0.162*** 
(4.18) 
0.169*** 
(3.58) 
0.138×10-1 0.737×10-1 
(1.55) 
0.834×10-1 
(1.47) 
0.445×10-2 
Head unemployed -0.279** 
(2.10) 
-0.301** 
(1.99) 
-0.213×10-1 -0.207×10-2 
(0.02) 
0.004
 
(0.03) 
0.230×10-3 
Head sick 0.133 
(1.06) 
0.130 
(0.94) 
0.116×10-1 0.955×10-1 
(0.68) 
0.115
 
(0.72) 
0.666×10-2 
Head chronically disabled 0.112×10-1 
(0.07) 
0.276×10-1 
(0.16) 
0.230×10-2 -0.235 
(1.22) 
-0.310 
(1.31) 
-0.130×10-1 
Constant -2.014*** 
(3.91) 
-2.179*** 
(3.69) 
 -1.542*** 
(2.83) 
-1.642*** 
(2.58) 
 
Log-likelihood -575.14 -573.01  -407.276 -405.60  
Wald-
2 (11) 114.91 95.23  35.58 25.67  
Notes: N=2054. Dependent variable is (a) for transfers: net transfer given=1 if net transfers given >0, zero otherwise (b) for loans: net loan given=1 if net loans 
given >0, zero otherwise. Asymptotic |t| statistics are shown in parentheses. ***-shows significance at 1% level; **-shows significance at 5%; *-shows 
significance at 10%. Marginal effects are based on random effects estimates. 
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Table 9: Ordered Probit and Probit Estimates of Net Transfer Receipts, Remittances Excluded 
 Ordered Probit Estimates Probit Estimates 
Variable 
Pooled Random Effects 
Net Recipient Net Giver 
Pooled Random Effects Pooled Random Effects 
Income -0.333×10-4** 
(2.32) 
-0.327×10-4* 
(1.65) 
-0.392×10-4 
(1.07) 
-0.396×10-4 
(0.66) 
0.350×10-4** 
(2.14) 
0.354×10-4 
(1.58) 
Household size 0.778×10-2 
(0.63) 
0.710×10-2 
(0.52) 
-0.220×10-1 
(1.22) 
-0.222×10-1 
(1.20) 
-0.292×10-1* 
(1.67) 
-0.289×10-1 
(1.53) 
Female headed 0.174*** 
(2.51) 
0.183** 
(2.37) 
0.242***
 
(2.50) 
0.249*** 
(2.47) 
-0.134 
(1.37) 
-0.137 
(1.25) 
Head’s age -0.141×10-1 
(1.13) 
-0.149×10-1 
(1.08) 
-0.167×10-1 
(1.04) 
-0.170×10-1 
(1.00) 
0.654×10-2 
(0.35) 
0.611×10-2 
(0.29) 
Head’s age squared 0.139×10-3 
(1.22) 
0.147×10-3 
(1.14) 
0.159×10-3 
(1.08) 
0.162×10-3 
(1.03) 
-0.946×10-4 
(0.51) 
-0.895×10-4 
(0.44) 
Head’s schooling -0.247×10-1*** 
(2.69) 
-0.270×10-1*** 
(2.72) 
0.146×10-1 
(1.12) 
0.147×10-1 
(1.09) 
0.501×10-1*** 
(4.10) 
0.557×10-1*** 
(4.02) 
Average schooling -0.136×10-1 
(1.16) 
-0.137×10-1 
(1.07) 
-0.175×10-1 
(1.07) 
-0.177×10-1 
(1.05) 
0.127×10-1 
(0.76) 
0.123×10-1 
(0.66) 
Number of workers -0.109*** 
(3.23) 
-0.109*** 
(3.29) 
0.225×10-2 
(0.05) 
0.262×10-2 
(0.06) 
0.181***
 
(5.05) 
0.188*** 
(4.36)  
Head unemployed 0.103 
(1.38) 
0.116 
(1.45) 
0.191***
 
(1.96) 
0.196*** 
(1.98) 
-0.403×10-1 
(0.37) 
-0.504×10-1 
(0.41) 
Head sick 0.364×10-1 
(0.43) 
0.417×10-1 
(0.48) 
0.108 
(1.02) 
0.111 
(1.02)  
0.506×10-1 
(0.44) 
0.469×10-1 
(0.37) 
Head chronically disabled 0.170 
(0.02) 
-0.745×10-2 
(0.07) 
0.882×10-3 
(0.01) 
-0.214×10-2 
(0.02) 
0.228×10-1 
(0.16) 
0.380×10-1 
(0.24) 
1  -1.988 
(5.87) 
-2.104 
(5.68) 
    
2  0.917 
(2.73) 
0.975 
(2.67) 
    
Log-likelihood -1342.26 -1339.30 638.44 -638.27 -690.01 -688.05 
Wald-
2 (11) 104.52 107.27 30.76 29.84 136.73 107.79 
Notes: N=2504. Asymptotic |t| statistics are shown in parentheses. ***-shows significance at 1% level; **-shows significance at 5%; *-shows significance at 
10%.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Construction 
Variable Definition/Construction 
Net transfer receipts Gross private transfers received minus gross private transfers given
 
Net loan receipts Total loans taken-repayments made-loans given+ repayments received 
Income Pre-transfer income earned from one or more of the following sources: 
wage/salary employment, informal female business, informal child 
business 
Household size Number of household members currently residing in the household 
Female headed Dummy variable=1 if head is female 
Head’s schooling Years of schooling completed by head 
Average schooling Average years of schooling completed by all household members above 
the age of 15 
Number of workers Number of household members involved in income-earning activity 
Head unemployed Dummy variable=1 if head is unemployed 
Head disabled Dummy variable=1 if head reported having a disability 
Head chronically 
disabled 
Dummy variable=1 if head’s reported disability is chronic (e.g. very 
poor or complete loss of eye sight) 
Head sick Dummy variable=1 if head reported experiencing illness in the month 
prior to the survey 
Note: Transactions considered include both cash and in-kind transfers and loans. Transfers, loans and income are 
all reported in real 1994 Ethiopian birr. 
 
